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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
THE TANGLED THICKET OF HEALTH CARE REFORM: THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN ACTION 
Gene Magidenko* 
On March 23, 2010, after a lengthy political debate on health 
care reform, President Barack Obama signed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) into law. A week 
later, he signed the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
of 2010, which amended certain provisions of PPACA. But far 
from ending the intense national debate on the issue, these 
enactments opened a new front of battle in the federal courts that 
will almost certainly make its way to the United States Supreme 
Court. Much of this litigation focuses on § 1501 of PPACA, which 
contains the controversial individual mandate1 requiring every 
individual to maintain minimum “essential coverage” (with 
certain exceptions). 
This is an interesting time to be a student of the law. Courts 
are issuing a steady stream of rulings on the individual mandate. 
For those following the debate in the courts, the challenges to the 
mandate present an opportunity to see constitutional 
jurisprudence in action. What is perhaps most remarkable is how 
quickly these cases have moved through the courts. As of this 
writing, five federal Courts of Appeals have already reviewed 
challenges to the mandate in one form or another. Two have 
ruled substantively on the underlying merits of the cases. A 
number of federal District Courts have also issued opinions. 
 
 
                                                   
* I would like to thank Professor Douglas A. Kahn, University of Michigan Law 
School, for his valuable suggestions and comments on this post. Any errors or omissions 
are exclusively my own. 
1.     Codified under 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A. 
J 
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THE CASES 
So what is the current state of the individual mandate? The 
short answer is that it is quite unclear. The longer answer calls for 
a romp through the thickets of judicial decision-making on the 
topic. 
The decisions tending to occupy the news and pundits alike 
are those of the federal circuits: 
• Thomas More Law Center v. Obama from the Sixth 
Circuit.2 This was the first and perhaps the most fascinating from 
a legal standpoint. In the fractured decision, Judge Boyce F. 
Martin, Jr. wrote most of the opinion of the court, where he 
determined that imminent injury established standing and the 
Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the claim. Having decided the 
procedural issues, Judge Martin concluded that the individual 
mandate is facially constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton delivered the rest of the opinion of the court, 
where he concluded that the mandate could not be sustained 
under the Taxing and Spending Clause. Examining the text of the 
statute, congressional intent, context, the central function of the 
mandate, and case law, he determined that the penalty for 
violating the individual mandate is a regulatory sanction – not a 
tax – and so he would look beyond its bare inclusion in the 
Internal Revenue Code to its substance. In an opinion concurring 
in the judgment, Judge Sutton wrote that he cannot overturn the 
mandate as facially unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause 
(citing United States v. Salerno), admittedly leaving open an as-
applied challenge. Judge James L. Graham, a District Court judge 
sitting by designation, concurred that the mandate cannot be 
sustained under the taxing power. However, he dissented from the 
Commerce Clause holding on federalism grounds. 
• New Jersey Physicians, Inc. v. President of the U.S. from 
the Third Circuit.3 The appellate panel consisting of Judges 
Michael Chagares, Kent A. Jordan, and Joseph A. Greenaway 
unanimously found that the plaintiffs could not show injury in 
fact, denying them standing to sue. 
                                                   
2.     651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011). 
3.     653 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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• Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services from the Eleventh Circuit.4 Judge 
Joel Fredrick Dubina, joined by Judge Frank M. Hull, determined 
that the individual mandate exceeded the congressional 
Commerce Clause power. Just like Judge Graham did in Thomas 
More Law Center, the court did not consider the activity/inactivity 
distinction dispositive. Instead, it too focused on federalism 
principles. Citing United States v. Lopez and United States v. 
Morrison, the judges noted the government’s lack of limiting 
principles on a Commerce Clause jurisprudence allowing 
Congress to reach non-market participants and mandating their 
entry into commerce. The judges were concerned with preserving 
the balance between the federal and state governments, as well as 
withholding from Congress general police powers usually 
reserved to the states. The court further held that the mandate is a 
civil regulatory penalty – not a tax – and therefore cannot be 
sustained under the Taxing and Spending Clause. Interestingly 
the court held the mandate severable from the rest of the Act. 
Judge Stanley Marcus concurred in part and dissented in part, 
stating that he would uphold the individual mandate under the 
Commerce Clause. 
• Baldwin v. Sebelius from the Ninth Circuit.5 The appellate 
panel consisting of Judges Pamela Ann Rymer, Ferdinand F. 
Fernandez, and Richard C. Tallman unanimously found that the 
plaintiffs could not show injury in fact and so lacked standing. 
• Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius from the Fourth 
Circuit.6 The appellate panel consisting of Judges Diana Gribbon 
Motz, Andre M. Davis, and James A. Wynn unanimously found 
that Virginia – as a state on whom no obligations are in fact 
imposed by the individual mandate – has no standing to sue, and 
therefore the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. 
• Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner from the Fourth 
Circuit.7 Decided on the same day by the same panel as Virginia 
ex rel. Cuccinelli, this is a more nuanced opinion. Judge Motz 
delivered the opinion of the court classifying the mandate’s 
penalty as tax, with the Anti-Injunction Act stripping the court of 
                                                   
4.      648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
5.      654 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2011). 
6.      __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 3925617 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011). 
7.      __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011). 
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jurisdiction. Judge Wynn concurred, but hypothesized that if there 
were no adjudicatory bar, he would uphold the law under the 
federal taxing power. Judge Davis dissented, finding that the Anti-
Injunction Act does not apply and concluding that he would 
uphold the mandate under the Commerce Clause. 
In addition, there are a number of cases from the federal 
district courts on the same subject. Disregarding those that have 
been reviewed in the appellate courts, they are: 
• Taitz v. Obama,8 where Judge Royce C. Lamberth found 
that, among other claims, the plaintiff did not have standing to 
challenge the individual mandate. 
• Shreeve v. Obama,9 where Judge Curtis L. Collier 
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
• Mead v. Holder,10 where Judge Gladys Kessler determined 
that taxpayers had standing and the action was ripe. In turn, Judge 
Kessler found that PPACA did not violate the Commerce Clause, 
Necessary and Proper Clause, General Welfare Clause, or the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
• Peterson v. United States,11 where Judge Joseph N. 
Laplante held that the Medicare-recipient plaintiff lacked standing 
to challenge PPACA and the manner in which it was passed. Judge 
Laplante found that PPACA's enactment did not violate the 
Presentment Clause, and that the plaintiff’s claim that the 
President violated his oath of office in signing the bill is not 
cognizable. 
• Kinder v. Geithner,12 where Judge Rodney W. Sippel held 
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 
• Bryant v. Holder,13 where Judge Keith Starrett, after 
dismissing the plaintiff’s prior complaint without prejudice for 
                                                   
8. 707 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
9. 2010 WL 4628177 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2010) (slip opinion). 
10. 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011). 
11. 774 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.H. 2011). 
12. 2011 WL 1576721 (E.D. Mo. April 26, 2011) (slip opinion). 
13. __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 4059243 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 29, 2011) (memorandum 
opinion and order). 
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certain deficiencies, found that the plaintiff does have standing to 
sue. The case is still ongoing. 
• Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services,14 where Judge Christopher C. Conner held that the 
individual mandate is outside the scope of the Commerce Clause. 
• Butler v. Obama,15 where Judge Joseph F. Bianco dismissed 
the case for a lack of standing, finding that the injuries alleged 
were neither actual nor imminent. 
THE FOUR TRENDS 
What trends can one divine from looking at these cases? The 
first and perhaps most obvious is that there is no clear legal 
consensus about the constitutionality of the individual mandate. 
This is especially telling where the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits 
have split on the merits of the objections to PPACA. It is almost 
axiomatic that the Supreme Court hears cases where circuits have 
split, and considering the potpourri of district court cases that 
could still potentially be decided by their respective circuits, the 
split may become even more pronounced. It is likely that even if a 
miraculous en banc review aligns the circuits (an unlikely event), 
the Supreme Court will have to resolve this disagreement. With 
quick appellate movement by both the government and the 
plaintiffs challenging the individual mandate, it is now appearing 
progressively more likely that the Supreme Court could take on 
PPACA during this present term. We may find out as early as 
November 10. Contrary to the perception that it takes cases years 
to work their way through the judicial system, individual mandate 
challenges have zipped through with surprising alacrity. The 
machinery of justice can be swift when the need calls for it. 
The second trend is the remarkable number of legal 
challenges that have failed due to a lack of standing to challenge 
the mandate. Those that have been decided on the merits have 
overcome or bypassed standing issues. The most reasonable 
explanation of why some cases have not progressed far at all, 
whereas others have been adjudicated on their substance, is 
simply that the cases can be distinguished on their facts. Different 
                                                   
14. __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 4072875 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2011). 
15. __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2011 WL 4526079 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011). 
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plaintiffs are situated differently, allowing for such disparate 
determinations. However, standing issues should not be 
immediately discounted. Since the individual mandate does not go 
into effect until 2014, no individual has yet been penalized for not 
maintaining coverage. Of course this does not per se bar a plaintiff 
from having standing to sue, as a significant possibility of future 
harm may be sufficient, although courts do need to be eminently 
careful to not overreach. 
The third trend is that, at least in those appellate courts where 
judges would strike down the individual mandate, the 
activity/inactivity distinction did not prove the lynchpin that many 
commentators supposed. The focus instead has been on broader 
federalism issues. In the United States’ system of federalism, the 
states are generally charged with the general police power to 
regulate the “safety, health, morals, and general welfare” of their 
citizens. The federal government, as one of limited and 
enumerated powers, does not possess the same authority. The 
question then is whether mandating insurance coverage for all – a 
power that a state may exercise – is within the federal 
government’s authority. The courts disagree in their responses to 
this question. Some judges contend that the Commerce Clause 
does grant such authority. Others find that it does not. 
The fourth trend is – where cases have been decided on the 
merits – the partial breakdown of the “conservative/liberal” 
dichotomy often attributed to the judiciary. Judge Jeffrey Sutton, 
appointed to the Sixth Circuit by Republican President George W. 
Bush, was the deciding vote that upheld the individual mandate, if 
only facially, in that court. On the other hand, Judge Frank M. 
Hull, appointed by Democratic President Bill Clinton, was in the 
majority that overturned the mandate in the Eleventh Circuit. 
Although this observation is not necessarily profound, as the 
traditional political dichotomy has never quite fit the judiciary, it 
is an excellent reminder of the usefulness of independent judges 
with lifetime tenure. 
CONCLUSION 
Uncertainty over how the Supreme Court might rule remains 
the white elephant in the room. As more cases are decided in the 
lower courts, the legal situation of the individual mandate 
becomes more complex. Ultimately the disagreement is about the 
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constitutional interpretation and scope of the Commerce Clause, 
as well as broader federalism issues. These are concerns with 
immediate and immense consequences for the way the nation is 
governed. The debate over the scope of federal regulatory 
authority has animated the legal profession since the founding of 
the Republic, and never with such animation as since the New 
Deal. And where the dispute is legal, not factual, and the circuits 
are irreconcilable, the nation looks to nine jurists to resolve the 
matter. With the novel issues surrounding the individual mandate, 
any guess about how a decision will play out in the Supreme 
Court can only ever be just that – a guess. One thing is certain: 
whatever decision the Court ultimately reaches on the merits, it 
shall be one for the ages. Rarely does a man recognize that he is 
living in times of great import and change until after the fact. 
This may well be one of those rare times. 
ADDENDUM 
The past several weeks saw some important movement in the 
challenges to PPACA. Firstly, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion on 
November 8, 2011 upholding the individual mandate. In Seven-
Sky v. Holder,16 Senior Judge Silberman, writing for the court, 
with Senior Judge Edwards concurring, held that the Anti-
Injunction Act17 did not apply, as the penalty for not maintaining 
insurance was not a tax. He also held that the individual mandate 
was covered by congressional powers under the Commerce 
Clause, notwithstanding the court’s discomfort with a lack of 
doctrinal limiting principles on Congress’s power to mandate 
participation in commerce. Judge Kavanaugh dissented, arguing 
that the individual mandate penalty is a tax and that, therefore, 
the Anti-Injunction Act presently bars adjudication. 
The Monday after the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, however, held 
even bigger news. On November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court 
announced that it would hear five-and-a-half hours of oral 
arguments on PPACA’s constitutionality in March. This means 
that there should be some sort of Court decision on the health 
care reform by June or so. Of course, it is possible that the Court 
will decide that the Anti-Injunction Act bars judicial review for the 
                                                   
16. __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 5378319 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011). 
17. 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2006). 
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time being, punting the issue down the road to a later year. Such a 
decision would be important for future Internal Revenue Code 
interpretation, but it would not address the substance of the 
challenges. Or the Court could decide the case on the merits. 
Either way, the next half-year will be particularly tense. 
  
